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Introduction
Throughout most of the United States’ financial
history, correspondent banking has been an
underpinning of our banking system. Banks use
correspondent banking relationships to deliver
services to customers in markets where the
bank has no physical presence. For example,
international correspondent banking relation-
ships are used by large banks seeking to pro-
vide services to multinational corporations and
in the finance of foreign trade. Due in part to
the historical limitations on geographic ex-
pansion by banks, correspondent banking has
been an important channel for delivering ser-
vices to domestic customers who may be oper-
ating in markets beyond the bank’s geographic
reach. Correspondent banking markets often
allow banks to purchase intermediate goods
and services at a lower cost than producing
them in-house—hence these markets may have
been critical to the success of community banks.
The ongoing consolidation of the U.S. bank-
ing system and the increasing geographic
scope of large banking institutions could have
important implications for the competitive
structure and, in turn, the efficiency of corre-
spondent banking markets. Whether these
changes will lead to more or less competition
in correspondent banking is unclear. On one
hand, consolidation will inevitably lead to a
reduction in the number of banks offering cor-
respondent banking services, thereby increas-
ing the market power of the remaining players.
On the other hand, given that correspondent
banking markets’ services are regionally or
locally based, interstate consolidation may
increase the number of providers in a local
market—even though the total number of sup-
pliers has been reduced nationally. Finally, the
shrinking number and increased average size
of banks may lead to a reduction in the
demand for correspondent banking services. 
Banking industry consolidation could have
important implications for the Federal Reserve
Banks in their traditional role as providers of
correspondent banking services. As banking
becomes less fragmented and more nationally
integrated, there is less need for the public cor-
respondent banking network operated by the
Federal Reserve Banks. However, if banking
consolidation appears to have materially dimin-
ished the competitiveness of private correspon-
dent banking markets, then the continued role
of Federal Reserve Banks as public competitors
may be warranted.
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issues, focusing on the impact of regulatory
changes to permit intrastate branching and
interstate banking. Our concern is primarily
with the impact of such changes on concentra-
tion in correspondent balances and domestic
deposit markets. We utilize the call report data
compiled by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examinations Council (FFIEC) and the Sum-
mary of Deposits data prepared by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Any
changes in concentration could have important
implications for the efficiency and competitive-
ness of banking markets.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I
provides an overview of correspondent bank-
ing. The correspondent banking literature is
reviewed in section II. Section III furnishes a
description of the data and the empirical strat-
egy. The results are discussed in section IV.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are
presented in section V.
I. An Overview 
of Correspondent
Banking
All firms face the fundamental decision of
whether to make or buy a particular input used
in production. For example, an automobile
manufacturer must decide whether to make its
own engines and transmissions or to buy them
from an outside supplier. Computer manufac-
turers must decide whether to make or buy the
processors used in their machines. Likewise, a
bank must decide whether to sort and present
10
for collection checks drawn on other banks that
have been deposited in customer accounts, or
to contract with a third party to perform this
function. For firms, the make-or-buy decision
depends on a number of factors, including the
nature of the input’s production function, the
firm’s demand for the good relative to the mar-
ket, and the competitive structures of the mar-
ket for the input good and the market for the
final good.
Banking literature refers to correspondent
banking as the purchase (by banks) of input
from other banks, central banks, and bank clear-
inghouses. For instance, when a bank in Cleve-
land sends checks to its local Federal Reserve
Bank for collection, it has purchased correspon-
dent banking services from that Reserve Bank.
Another example is a recent agreement between
J. P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan Bank, in
which Chase provides European currency clear-
ing services for Morgan.1  The main services pro-
vided by correspondent banks are discussed in
section II and in the appendix.
Correspondent banking relationships are
relevant to the cost structure of the U.S. deposi-
tory institutions sector. As table 1 shows, the
legacy of our unit-banking system—a conse-
quence of intrastate and interstate branching
restrictions—is a highly fragmented banking
system with a large number of small, locally and
regionally based institutions. Economies of scale
in the production of inputs associated with the
provision of many types of bank services, espe-
cially payments services, exceed the range of
output for most community banks.2  Further-
more, community banks lack the geographic
scope needed to capitalize on network external-
ities. Hence, in the absence of correspondent
banking markets, community banks would
likely be less efficient providers of financial ser-
vices and would have more difficulty surviving
in increasingly competitive banking markets.
In a typical correspondent banking relation-
ship, the supplier of services is another bank.
The provider of services in the input market can
be viewed as a vertically integrated firm that
may compete with the community bank in the
output market. For the integrated firm, the
benefits of supplying correspondent banking
services are clear. First, there are economies of
scope between production of input for its own
products and production of correspondent
banking products. Second, providing correspon-
dent banking services may allow the integrated
n 1 See Steven Marjanovic, “Morgan Taps Rival Chase for Europe
Clearances,” The American Banker, August 11, 1998, p. 1.
n 2 See Bauer and Ferrier (1996).
T A B L E 1
FDIC-Insured Commercial Banksa
Bank size Number of banks Total assetsb
Less than $25 million 1,370  22,496
$25 to $50 million 2,026  75,077
$50 to $100 million 2,251  161,502
$100 to $300 million 2,259  371,720
$300 to $500 million 400  152,924
$500 to $1 billion 304  209,387
$1 to $3 billion 206  332,204
$3 to $10 billion 104  596,790
$10 billion or more 64  3,260,657
Total institutions 8,984  5,182,759
a. As of June 30, 1988.
b. In millions of dollars
SOURCE:  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Banking
(http://www.fdic.gov/databank/sob/).
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bank to more fully exploit economies of scale or
network effects. This, in turn, lowers the cost of
producing (or increases the demand for) its own
downstream products.
The competitive structure of the correspon-
dent banking market may also be relevant to
the structure of the markets for bank products.
Industrial organization theory tells us that if 
the integrated firm has substantial monopoly
power in the upstream (input) market, then it
may use that power to damage its rival in the
downstream market.3  Thus, if the supplier of
correspondent banking services competes with
its customer (the community bank) in the out-
put market, then it may price its services above
the average cost of production—thereby dam-
aging the community bank’s ability to compete.
The integrated bank’s ability to do this depends
on the competitive structure of the upstream
and downstream markets.
II. Literature Review
A correspondent banking relationship involves
a correspondent bank, which provides the ser-
vices, and a respondent bank receiving them.
The respondent usually pays for the services by
maintaining correspondent balances at the
larger bank. The mix of services that might be
provided is broad, but appears to emphasize
check processing, especially for smaller banks,
and loan participation. Other services include
providing reports on economic conditions,
making securities recommendations, and safe-
keeping securities. Correspondents also have
made markets for federal funds, in effect reduc-
ing the minimum size of such transactions.4
Correspondent services are not paid for
directly with fees, but rather implicitly through
maintaining deposit balances.5  Some critics
have claimed that greater efficiency would
result from direct payment and have implied
that smaller banks might not always have
known the true cost of the services.6  Banks,
however, historically have opposed the intro-
duction of direct fees.
The early literature on correspondent bank-
ing appears to have grown in response to two
developments: One was the decline in Federal
Reserve membership, which led to the estab-
lishment of regional Federal Reserve check pro-
cessing centers in the early 1970s and the pas-
sage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. The other
was the prospect of increased merger activity in
banking, rationalized by a purported positive
impact on banking efficiency. Early research
n 3 See McAfee (this issue) for a discussion of the damage-your-rival
argument and a counterexample.
n 4 Knight (1970a) reported that about 90 percent of the banks sur-
veyed indicated that their correspondents offered to help with international
banking services, collections, bank wire, and advice on consumer credit,
credit information, and electronic data processing.
n 5 Implicitly, as was pointed out by Flannery (1983), the correspon-
dent should provide services costing [1 – r]r, where r is the reserve
requirement and r is the market interest rate.
n 6 Although fees are not charged directly for correspondent ser-
vices, detailed account analyses were performed to estimate the revenue
and expenses from correspondent accounts (see Knight [1970a]).
n 7 See Knight (1970a, 1970b).
explored whether correspondent banking
allowed smaller banks to gain access, or gain
access at a lower cost, to some of the services
that might be provided through mergers or
acquisitions. This would imply, for example,
that correspondent relationships provided alter-
natives to mergers permitted by interstate bank-
ing, and that the correspondent system might
be affected by such developments. Another
closely related issue was economies of scale in
the production of important banking services.
Certain services, such as processing of interna-
tional financial transactions or specialized loan
programs, were more likely than others to be
provided at a lower cost by larger banks. An
issue related to the impact of mergers on effi-
ciency was whether holding-company affilia-
tion might allow smaller banks to gain access
to economies of scale in certain services pro-
vided by the lead bank, which is presumably
larger. The argument had been made that
allowing small banks to join holding compa-
nies would allow them to reduce the number
of correspondent accounts—and the total
amount of interbank balances held—but main-
tain the same level of correspondent services.
However, evidence as early as 1970 showed
that, contrary to this argument, the average size
of interbank accounts appeared the same for
smaller banks in or out of holding companies.
This suggested that holding-company affiliation
did not provide small banks with meaningful
opportunities to economize on holdings of
interbank balances.7  Another alleged advan-
tage of holding-company affiliation was the
increased ease of getting loan participations.
While some evidence in favor of this was
found, the related claim that banks facing fund-
ing or capital constraints would have an easier
time placing loan participations with their
respondents (that is, the banks purchasing cor-
respondent services) could not be supported.
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We are not aware of any studies that directly
tackle the question of whether efficiency is
enhanced by the presence of a correspondent
banking network. A few studies take an indirect
look at efficiency by analyzing overall econo-
mies of scale for banks, taking account of the
provision of correspondent banking services—
something that previous work on economies of
scale using functional cost analysis (FCA) data
failed to control for. Dunham (1981) found that
after controlling for the provision of correspon-
dent banking services, noncorrespondent bank-
ing services exhibited economies of scale in
production—something that previous studies
were unable to find. This could be the result of
two factors: First, if small banks trade relatively
more correspondent balances for services (with
such payments not reflected in the FCA data),
they would appear more efficient. Second,
larger banks producing more “due to” accounts,
which are more service-intensive, would appear
to have higher costs.
Flannery (1983) also re-estimated bank cost
functions after adjusting for the understatment
the cost to the bank purchasing correspondent
services. He found that branch bank scale
economies were overestimated, but those of
unit banks were not affected. Gilbert (1983)
found economies of scale in the provision of
correspondent services, which he claims were
due to an inverse relation between the amount
of demand balances due to banks and their
short-run variability.
Prior to the move toward interstate banking,
it was already apparent that correspondent
banking might allow smaller banks to over-
come the obstacles to geographic diversification
posed by interstate banking restrictions. One
possibility is that correspondent banking would
help effect a transfer of funds from surplus to
deficit areas. Loan participations are a major
vehicle for this. Funds are transferred from the
larger correspondent bank to a smaller re-
spondent bank to meet a loan request that
either exceeds funds available through local
deposits or exceeds legal lending limits. Pay-
ment for such correspondent services is made
in terms of the respondent’s balances at the
correspondent bank. Knight (1970b) presents
evidence supporting the hypothesis that corre-
spondent banking provides a channel for
funds to flow from surplus to deficit areas.
This author documents a large net flow of
funds to correspondents, even from respon-
dent banks that originated loan participations.
The appendix provides further detail on this
branch of the literature.
The possibility that correspondent banking
might affect the competitiveness of downstream
markets was recognized early on. Consistent
with occasional concerns that correspondents
might steal business from their respondents,
Knight (1970a) indicates that money market
correspondents would participate only if the
originating bank would reciprocate in participa-
tions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
correspondents had stated the view that bor-
rowers consistently unable to obtain loans from
the respondent should switch to the correspon-
dent for lending.
Early work presaged a concern over the
impact of regulatory policies on the correspon-
dent banking system. Obviously, any regulatory
change that influenced correspondent services,
such as check-clearing arrangements, might
have a direct effect on the use of private corre-
spondents for such services. Knight (1972)
focuses on the impact of the Federal Reserve
System’s development of regional check pro-
cessing centers (RCPCs) and the change in Reg-
ulation J requiring all banks to pay for cash let-
ters received from Federal Reserve Banks on
the day of receipt in immediately available
funds. The creation of the RCPCs was seem-
ingly intended to improve the efficiency of the
check-clearing mechanism by permitting all
participating banks to route items drawn on
other participating banks to the clearing center
on the day of the deposit. The Regulation J
change may have had the effect of transferring
collected funds from outlying (rural) banks
(which had been granted a delay in paying
after receipt of a cash letter) to city banks. For
Federal Reserve member banks this regulatory
change effectively reduced the burden of
reserve requirements. However, during this
time in most states, nonmember banks could
count correspondent balances toward reserve
requirements set by their state banking regula-
tory agency. Therefore, a differential impact
might have been felt by outlying nonmember
banks since they would not have had the
advantage of reduced reserve requirements. 
Other Federal Reserve System policies have
had key regulatory influences on the develop-
ment of the correspondent banking system.
Kane (1982) discusses Title I of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 (DIDMC), which mandated that the
Fed make its correspondent services available
to all depository institutions and that they be
explicitly priced. Historically, the Fed had
offered correspondent services to members free
of charge, in part to offset costs associated with
then-higher reserve requirements faced by
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1999 Q113
member banks. Rising interest rates increased
the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Hence,
rising interest rates during the 1970s would have
increased the cost of Fed membership, and the
ability of banks to leave the System may have
increased pressure on the Fed to offer addi-
tional services. These included access to the dis-
count window and the hope of receiving prefer-
ential regulatory treatment.8  Other aspects of
Federal Reserve membership and relevant regu-
lation are discussed in the appendix.
III. Framework for
Analysis and Data
Data limitations constrain our choice of an ana-
lytical framework likely to have empirical
applicability. Many of the studies cited above
utilize data generated by one-time surveys of
specific geographical regions. “Due to” and
“due from” balances, corresponding to the lia-
bility and assets entries for the deposits of the
respondent with the correspondent, respec-
tively, are provided on the FFIEC’s call report
forms. However, these reports do not allow us
to match up the two banks. In addition, the
due-to numbers are not available for small
banks. Aside from information about organiza-
tional structure, location, and mergers and
acquisition history, few of the variables ana-
lyzed in the studies cited previously are avail-
able in regular reports. Our approach here
focuses on the correspondent balance numbers
and the data on overall domestic deposits. Sup-
plemental data on deposit markets is con-
structed using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits
data, which are available on an annual basis.
T A B L E 2
State Branching Status
n 8 In Kane’s analysis, the fact that private correspondents offer a
wider array of services implies that the balance requirements set by them
exceed the Fed’s reserve requirements on the same balances.
Year Year Effective
switched switched to date for
Current to limited statewide interstate
State statusa branching branching banking
Alabama Statewide 1987 5/31/97
Alaska Statewide 1/1/94
Arizona Statewide 8/31/96
Arkansas Limited  5/31/97
California Statewide  10/2/95
Colorado Limited  1991 6/0/97
Connecticut Statewide  6/27/95
Delaware Statewide  9/29/95
District of 
Columbia Statewide  6/13/96
Florida Statewide  5/31/97
Georgia Limited  6/1/97
Hawaii Statewide  6/1/97
Idaho Statewide  7/1/95
Illinois Statewide  1988 1994 6/1/97
Indiana Statewide  1991 3/15/96
Iowa Limited  6/1/97
Kansas Statewide  1988 1990 6/1/97
Kentucky Limited  6/1/97
Louisiana Statewide  1990 6/1/97
Maine Statewide  1/1/97
Maryland Statewide  9/29/95
Massachusetts Statewide  8/2/96
Michigan Statewide  1987 11/29/95
Minnesota Limited  6/1/97
Mississippi Statewide  1990 5/1/97
Missouri Statewide  1987 1991 6/1/97
Montana Limited  1990 3/21/97
Year Year Effective
switched switched to date for
Current to limited statewide interstate
State status a branching branching banking
Nebraska Limited  5/31/97
Nevada Statewide  9/28/95
New 
Hampshire Statewide  6/1/97
New Jersey Statewide  4/17/96
New Mexico Statewide  1991 6/1/96
New York Statewide  2/6/96
North 
Carolina Statewide  6/22/95
North 
Dakota Limited  1991 5/31/97
Ohio Statewide  1990 5/21/97
Oklahoma Statewide 1993 5/31/97
Oregon Statewide 2/27/95
Pennsylvania Statewide  1990 7/6/95
Rhode Island Statewide  6/20/95
South Carolina Statewide  7/1/96
South Dakota Statewide  7/1/96
Tennessee Statewide  1990 6/1/97
Texas Statewide  1990 8/28/95
Utah Statewide  6/1/95
Vermont Statewide  5/30/96
Virginia Statewide  7/1/95
Washington Statewide  6/6/96
West Virginia Statewide  1988 5/31/97
Wisconsin Statewide  1990 6/1/97
Wyoming Limited  1991 5/31/97
a. As of June 30, 1996.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Reports (various).
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The sample period studied here covers
June 30, 1984, to June 30, 1996, and includes
many shifts from unit banking to limited branch-
ing, and from limited branching to statewide
branching. Table 2 details the history of such
regulatory changes during our sample period. 
While numerous analyses have focused on
the issue of whether banking efficiency has
been enhanced by the recent wave of mergers
and acquisitions (M&As), the role of correspon-
dent banking has been unclear. Ideally, our
analysis of changing concentration in corre-
spondent banking markets would take this fac-
tor into account. It is not possible, however, to
directly examine the effect of M&As on effi-
ciency using the existing data.
One possibility is that M&As would render
unnecessary the pre-existing correspondent
relationships involving the formerly indepen-
dent banks. On the other hand, they could
reduce the competitiveness and efficiency of the
remaining system. Similar concerns arise with
the changes in branching status that we identify.
Branching economies might be affected. The
presumption is that the largest bank is the corre-
spondent. After the absorption of unit banks as
branches of the new bank, the correspondent
deposits no longer appear on the reports at the
bank level upon which we focus.
Finally, data on market prices charged for
private correspondent banking services do not
exist, especially at the individual market level.
Therefore, we rely on measures of market con-
centration, such as the Herfindahl index, to
investigate the impact of branching deregula-
tion on the structure of the interbank market. It
is important to note, however, that market con-
centration measures are not always good prox-
ies for the degree of competition in a market.
Hence, increased concentration may not neces-
sarily indicate a less competitive market—
especially if the event driving market consol-
idation increases the degree of potential
competition (contestability) in that market.
IV. Results
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the ongoing consolida-
tion of the domestic commercial banking indus-
try and its implications for the correspondent
banking market nationwide. While the number
of banks has fallen steadily from 1984 to 1996,
the market share of the top 50 correspondent
banks has risen from 28.18 percent to 36.57
percent of all deposits due to banks over the
same time period. Similar results are found
when looking at the market share held by the
T A B L E 3
Banks and Branches
Year Banks Branches Offices
1966 13,529 16,842 30,371
1967 13,506 17,884 31,390
1968 13,479 18,966 32,445
1969 13,464 20,149 33,613
1970 13,502 21,597 35,099
1971 13,602 23,080 36,682
1972 13,721 24,566 38,287
1973 13,964 26,403 40,367
1974 14,218 28,384 42,602
1975 14,372 29,929 44,301
1976 14,397 31,068 45,465
1977 14,397 32,836 47,233
1978 14,378 34,524 48,902
1979 14,351 36,521 50,872
1980 14,421 38,458 52,879
1981 14,401 40,500 54,901
1982 14,435 39,485 53,920
1983 14,454 40,548 55,002
1984 14,483 41,485 55,968
1985 14,402 42,970 57,372
1986 14,193 44,054 58,247
1987 13,705 45,017 58,722
1988 13,119 46,036 59,155
1989 12,697 47,650 60,347
1990 12,329 50,017 62,346
1991 11,909 51,591 63,500
1992 11,449 51,544 62,993
1993 10,944 52,467 63,411
1994 10,431 54,656 65,087
1995 9,921 56,028 65,949
1996 9,511 57,258 66,769
1997 9,125 59,773 68,898
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Banking
(http://www.fdic.gov/databank/sob/).




Yeara Top 50 banks Top 10 banks Top 5 banks
1984 28.18 11.92 7.51
1985 27.79 14.78 10.51
1986 26.89 11.87 8.07
1987 26.47 11.53 7.78
1988 25.53 10.94 7.05
1989 27.82 13.15 8.66
1990 29.79 12.99 8.64
1991 28.61 12.89 8.95
1992 29.43 12.38 7.76
1993 30.44 13.39 7.99
1994 32.64 13.33 8.40
1995 33.52 14.94 8.52
1996 36.57 16.07 9.99
a. As of June 30.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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top 10 and top five correspondent banks nation-
wide. Despite the increased concentration of
correspondent banking deposits shown in table
4, the national market for correspondent bank-
ing remains relatively unconcentrated, with no
firm controlling more than 3.6 percent of
deposits due to banks.
Unfortunately, most markets for correspon-
dent banking services are likely to be local or
regional in scope and, therefore, national con-
centration measures may prove misleading. For
example, if correspondent banking markets are
effectively segmented by branching restrictions
(intrastate or interstate), then low levels of mar-
ket concentration at the national level may be
consistent with highly concentrated markets at
the state or local level. Moreover, to the extent
that banking consolidation increases the con-
testability of correspondent banking markets,
increases in market concentration at the
national level may lead to more competitive
correspondent banking markets at the state and
local levels.
Data on correspondent banking markets 
are collected at the bank level, limiting our
ability to accurately gauge the competitiveness
of these markets. Moreover, the degree of
aggregation in the data precludes us from
looking at measures of concentration below
the state level for both deposits due to banks
(correspondent deposits) and deposits due
from banks (respondent deposits).
To examine trends in market concentration
at the state level, we construct Herfindahl
indexes for deposits due to banks (correspon-
dent deposits) and for deposits due from banks
(respondent deposits). Tables 5 and 6 report
the average Herfindahl for all states, states with
statewide branching, states with limited branch-
ing, and unit banking states. Table 5 shows that
correspondent banking is more concentrated,
on average, in statewide branching states than
it is in states with more restrictive branching
laws. However, while mean concentration for
the total of all states has risen over the sample
period, holdings of correspondent deposits
have become less concentrated in statewide
branching states. The increasing mean concen-
tration of correspondent deposits for all states
over time likely reflects the ongoing consolida-
tion of the banking system, especially in those
states switching to less restrictive branching
laws during the sample period. Moreover, the
decline in the mean concentration of corre-
spondent deposits for the statewide branching
states over the sample period may simply
reflect the inclusion of new states in the sam-
ple. If correspondent deposit markets in states
that switched to statewide branching during the
sample period are less concentrated than the
average statewide branching state in the sam-
ple, then mean concentration for the sample
should decrease over time.
Table 6 shows that respondent deposits (de-
posits due from banks) are also more concen-
trated in statewide branching states. To the ex-
tent that banking markets are more consolidated
T A B L E 5
Deposits Due to Banks:
State-Level Herfindahl
All Statewide Limited Unit
Yeara states branching branching banking
1984 1,302.32 1,814.80 730.67 987.02
1985 1,328.69 2,060.31 577.37 632.83
1986 1,315.64 1,989.67 632.66 746.03
1987 1,322.13 1,863.52 657.61 847.76
1988 1,467.51 1,861.73 804.60 1,646.37
1989 1,379.42 1,826.39 612.90 1,635.88
1990 1,416.91 1,549.98 803.99 2,271.65
1991 1,476.31 1,580.03 1,139.21
1992 1,507.27 1,622.51 1,132.74
1993 1,379.61 1,396.87 1,316.83
1994 1,617.10 1,679.40 1,361.66
1995 1,602.90 1,665.53 1,346.11
1996 1,510.14 1,611.97 1,092.68
a. As of June 30.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 6
Deposits Due from Banks:
State-Level Herfindahl
All Statewide Limited Unit
Yeara states branching branching banking
1984 2,121.30 3,084.66 1,210.53 1,160.00
1985 2,014.97 3,140.98 968.51 850.74
1986 2,240.79 3,561.01 1,021.35 858.86
1987 2,011.15 2,994.41 921.99 863.66
1988 1,854.20 2,714.22 895.89 488.00
1989 1,944.99 2,927.31 772.17 666.13
1990 2,176.47 2,794.63 699.32 787.21
1991 2,316.39 2,778.43 814.77
1992 2,591.18 2,951.34 1420.68
1993 2,708.97 3,186.43 972.77
1994 2,700.65 3,141.37 893.69
1995 3,022.00 3,486.61 1,117.09
1996 2,984.88 3,307.98 1,660.20
a. As of June 30.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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in statewide branching states, one would
expect to see fewer banks placing deposits
with correspondent banks and, therefore,
greater concentration. Unlike correspondent
balances, however, respondent deposits do not
clearly increase or decrease through time either
for the full sample or for statewide branching
states. Therefore, the implication of interstate
branching on the concentration of respondent
deposits is unclear.
The negative relationship between concen-
tration in interbank deposit markets and the
stringency of geographic limitations (that is,
branching restrictions) may simply be a conse-
quence of more concentrated deposit markets.
That is, relaxation of branching restrictions may
increase the concentration of banking deposits
—a likely outcome of a more consolidated
banking system—which, in turn, leads to more
concentrated interbank-deposit markets. Tables
7 and 8 seem to bear this point out: Table 7
exhibits average Herfindahls at the state level
for domestic deposits. Table 8 presents average
market-level Herfindahls grouped by state
branching status.9  In both tables, statewide
branching states tend to exhibit more deposit
market concentration than other states, and the
level of concentration has tended to increase
over the sample period.
Simple correlation analysis confirms a high
degree of correlation between interbank-deposit
concentration and concentration measures of
domestic deposit markets. The Spearman (Pear-
son) correlation coefficient between the state-
level Herfindahl indexes for domestic deposits
and correspondent deposits is 0.7033 (0.7153).
The Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficient
between the state-level Herfindahl indexes for
domestic deposits and respondent deposits is
0.7131 (0.6756). Moreover, the structure of the
correspondent deposit market and the respon-
dent deposit market are highly correlated with a
Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficient of
0.45665 (0.52298).
One problem with looking at time trends 
in Herfindahl indexes across states with differ-
ent branching laws is that a number of states
changed their laws during the sample period.
This is evident from the disappearance of unit
banking in the sample in 1991. All changes in
branching status favored a less restrictive form
of branching regulation. Therefore, a measure
of caution is warranted when comparing trends
in concentration across subcategories in tables
5 through 8. 
Fortunately, we can directly test the impact
of relaxing intrastate branching restrictions on
deposit market concentration. For all states that
changed branching status during the sample
period (there were 22 such switches), we con-
structed state-level Herfindahls for domestic
deposits, correspondent deposits, and respon-
dent deposits two years prior to and two years
T A B L E 7
Domestic Deposits:
State-Level Herfindahl
All Statewide Limited Unit
Yeara states branching branching banking
1984 803.57 1,413.75 245.13 155.41
1985 839.97 1,476.55 264.17 146.19
1986 829.74 1,434.67 290.64 152.30
1987 822.19 1,341.83 275.91 144.49
1988 874.87 1,363.18 305.17 191.21
1989 924.22 1,431.53 324.04 243.95
1990 948.53 1,216.49 310.75 284.19
1991 975.79 1,175.25 327.55
1992 1,037.58 1,254.06 334.01
1993 1,035.08 1,208.44 404.70
1994 1,079.96 1,233.59 450.09
1995 1,165.78 1,318.10 541.27
1996 1,301.08 1,449.48 692.67
a. As of June 30.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 8
Domestic Deposits: Weighted 
Average Herfindahls for All Markets
All Statewide Limited Unit
Date states branching branching banking
1984 2,269.58 2,502.29 2,309.44 1,379.66
1985 2,281.17 2,512.56 2,368.29 1,320.86
1986 1,886.94 1,983.10 2,288.14 1,337.33
1987 1,888.29 1,970.49 2,192.11 1,262.59
1988 2,451.90 2,597.36 2,231.45 1,750.54
1989 2,566.49 2,665.32 2,298.59 2,318.25
1990 2,674.95 2,786.77 1,850.64 2,046.39
1991 2,717.42 2,800.73 1,709.98
1992 2,936.77 3,057.20 1,723.09
1993 2,946.38 3,061.80 1,726.98
1994 3,048.91 3,024.30 2,298.79
1995 3,120.80 3,100.03 2,306.78
1996 3,280.86 3,182.87 2,922.62
a. As of June 30.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
n 9 In table 9, we assume that for bank offices located in MSAs the
relevant market is the MSA. For bank offices located in non-MSA counties,
the market is defined to be the county where the office is located.
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after the event. We then tested to see if the
change in the Herfindahls due to the change 
in branching status was significant. The results
of the analysis are reported in table 9. For do-
mestic deposits and correspondent deposits
(deposits due to banks), a switch to more lib-
eral branching significantly increases the Her-
findahl; however, the change in the respondent
deposit (deposits due from banks) Herfindahl
is not significant.
In all, univariate analysis of the data sug-
gests that a relaxation of branching restrictions
is associated with increased concentration in
the market for domestic deposits and in the
interbank deposit market. Neither of these
results is surprising, as the removal of an artifi-
cial constraint to geographic consolidation of
the banking system would be expected to
increase concentration in banking markets.
However, increased concentration does not
necessarily translate into less competitive mar-
kets, as the removal of branching restrictions
increases the potential for entry.
To separate the effects of branching status
from deposit market concentration, we conduct
a simple regression analysis—with the Herfin-
dahl for correspondent deposits as the depen-
dent variable. The results can be found in 
table 10. Model 1 regresses the correspondent
deposit Herfindahl on the state-level Herfind-
ahl for domestic deposits and a time dummy.
Model 2 adds a statewide branching dummy
variable (DSBRANCH = 1 for statewide branch-
ing, zero otherwise). A significant coefficient
on DSBRANCH suggests that after controlling
for the structure of the domestic deposit mar-
ket, branching restrictions affect the structure
of the correspondent banking market. Model 3
controls for the market concentration for re-
spondent deposits. To the extent that there are
scale and scope economies associated with the
provision of correspondent banking services,
increased concentration in respondent deposits
may reduce the number of correspondent
banks that can profitably operate in a market.
Finally, model 4 extends the previous regres-
sion by including information on local market
structure—HLOCDEP, the average local de-
posit market Herfindahl in each state. Inclusion
of HLOCDEP allows us to control for the effect
of local deposit market structure on correspon-
dent banking.
The coefficient on the domestic deposit
Herfindahl (HDOMDEP) is positive and signifi-
cant from zero in all four models. In addition,
the coefficient on the proxy for local deposit
market structure (HLOCDEP) in model 4 is also
positive and significant. This confirms the uni-
variate results that find increased deposit mar-
ket concentration associated with increased
concentration in correspondent deposit mar-
kets. The negative and significant coefficient
on DSBRANCH in models 2, 3, and 4 suggests
that once domestic deposit market concentra-
tion is controlled for, relaxing branching re-
strictions leads to less concentrated and more
T A B L E 9
Event Analysis: Change
in Branching Status
2 years 2 years Percent
prior to after Change in change in
Variable switch switch Herfindahl Herfindahl
Domestic  264.96 403.33 138.37a 81.78a
deposits 4.50 3.78
Deposits due  789.67 791.48 1.82 1.42
from banks 0.02 0.17
Deposits due  828.22 1436.55 608.32a 144.26a
to banks 3.17 3.27
a. Significant at the 1 percent level
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 10
Regression Results
Dependent Variable:  HDEPIDOM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 533.373 607.623 578.900 338.734
7.175 7.987 7.581 3.402
Timedum –13.546a –6.202b –6.987b –12.697b
–1.546a –0.698b –0.790b –1.424b
HDOMDEP 1.022 1.114 1.028 0.949
26.267 24.510 18.796 16.730






Adj-R2 0.512 0.522 0.527 0.527
F-Value 348.217 241.887 185.302 145.451
Prob >F 0 0 0 0
a. Significant at the 10 percent level.
b. Not significant.




Economic Review 1999 Q118
competitive correspondent banking markets. Fi-
nally, the positive and significant coefficient on
the respondent deposit Herfindahl (HINTBDEP)
index is consistent with the hypothesis that a re-
duction in the number of respondent banks
reduces the number of correspondents that can
coexist in a market—and hence increases con-
centration of correspondent deposits.
V. Conclusion
Interstate branching promises to change the
competitive landscape in banking. As illustrated
by the mega-mergers of 1998—which included
the merger of Bank of America and NationsBank
—geographic consolidation of the banking sys-
tem is well under way. This consolidation will
certainly increase the concentration of deposit
markets at the national and regional level.
Moreover, the preceding analyses suggest that
interstate consolidation may even increase
deposit market concentration at the state and
local level.
The evidence presented here indicates that
intrastate branching deregulation and the sub-
sequent geographic consolidation of the bank-
ing industry has led to increased concentration
in the correspondent and respondent deposit
markets. However, this increased concentration
in the interbank market appears to be a conse-
quence of increased concentration in the
domestic deposit market associated with more
liberal branching rights. Controlling for the
level of concentration in the domestic deposit
market, the effect of statewide branching is to
reduce concentration in the correspondent
deposit market. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that any positive effects of
increased contestability of interbank markets
resulting from the removal of branching restric-
tions mitigate (and may dominate) any negative
effects on competition from increased concen-
tration in interbank markets.
Overall, the evidence presented here sug-
gests that interstate branching will result in more
concentrated interbank markets, as the geo-
graphic consolidation of the banking industry at
the national level will certainly reduce the num-
ber of correspondent and respondent banks
nationwide. This increased concentration in cor-
respondent banking markets will not necessarily
reduce the competitiveness of these markets at
the state and local level because branching
deregulation also increases their contestability.
There are several caveats to these results:
First, data limitations preclude our controlling
for important nonbank competitors in the corre-
spondent banking market such as banker’s
banks, private clearinghouses, data processing
firms, and the Federal Reserve Banks. Second,
to the extent that banking organizations use the
multibank holding company to circumvent
branching restrictions, the measured impact of
branching deregulation on market concentration
and contestability will be overstated. 
From a public-policy standpoint, if interstate
branching leads to the establishment of truly
national correspondent banks, then there may
be less justification for the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem to provide correspondent banking services.
However, more work needs to be done in this
area before we can begin to seriously recon-









Early literature indicates that loan participa-
tions are the second-most important service
offered by correspondents. However, informa-
tion about this activity is not available on the
periodic reports submitted by banks. Knight
(1970b) reports that 75 percent of banks expe-
riencing an increased need for loan assistance
cited the size of the loan as the main factor.
The percentage of banks requiring loan assis-
tance increased with bank size, and require-
ments for assistance are positively related to the
loan-to-deposit ratio, the latter possibly indicat-
ing the importance of liquidity constraints.
Knight (1970a) indicates that although most
loan participations originate with the smaller
banks, banks that do not experience excess
loan demands can still buy loans or participa-
tions from their correspondents. Many respon-
dents maintained credit lines or borrowed
directly from their correspondents.
The correspondent services offered by the
Federal Reserve System to its member banks
have differed somewhat from those offered by
private correspondents, and this has been a sub-
ject of contention and regulatory reform. Access
to the discount window is probably the most
obvious correspondent service that at some time
might have been available only to members.
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Federal Reserve membership has been iden-
tified as an important factor by several authors.
The two reasons most often cited for nonmem-
ber banks being more likely to use correspon-
dent services were the possibility that states
with reserve requirements would allow non-
members to count balances due as reserves,
and the granting of immediate credit by corre-
spondents for cash letters received from
respondents. Lawrence and Lougee (1970)
found that balances due from banks, but not
the number of correspondent ties or their geo-
graphical distribution, is related to Fed mem-
bership. Member banks have higher balances
due if balances at the Fed are included, but not
if they are excluded. Knight (1970a) confirms
this finding and also reports that the benefits of
Fed membership appear to increase with bank
size since, unlike overall banks, nonmember
banks over a certain (small) size have corre-
spondent balances that increase with bank size.
Knight (1970a) reported that about 90 percent
of banks surveyed preferred to send checks
drawn on nonlocal banks through correspon-
dents rather than the Fed, apparently because
immediate credit was offered by the former.
Although larger banks appear to have a greater
preference for using the Fed, this could be mis-
leading if correspondents send checks received
from smaller banks on to the Fed for clearing. 
Summers and Segala (1979) focus on the
determinants of usage of Fed correspondent
services. They find that bank size, holding-com-
pany affiliation, and metropolitan location
increase the probability of a bank using Fed
check-clearing services. However, only bank
size affected usage of Fed wire services. Size is
interpreted as indicating administrative capacity
to manage the services.
Several other determinants of correspondent
balances have been identified in the literature.
For example, Lawrence and Lougee (1970)
report that for banks in the Denver area, bank
size, ratio of demand to total deposits, and dis-
tance of the bank from Denver are positively
related to the amount of domestic “due from”
balances. The number of correspondent ties is
related to the first two characteristics. Meinster
and Mohindru (1975) conclude that correspon-
dent balances are influenced by liquidity consid-
erations as well as the need to pay for corre-
spondent services. The volatility of deposits is
another factor: Kane (1982) found that suppliers
of correspondent services imposed higher
reserve requirements on more volatile deposits,
a practice which is presumably consistent with
volatility being related to the benefits derived
from the services. Gilbert (1983) identifies a rela-
tionship between deposit volatility and the scale
of correspondent services, with transaction cost
being lowered by a larger number of respon-
dents and thus a higher level of variability.
Geographic variables also play a role. Dis-
tance from the correspondent obviously is re-
lated to the cost of providing certain services, 
as well as familiarity with the correspondent.
Size of city could, at times, be related to sophis-
tication and consequently to the need for cer-
tain services.
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